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Claims Against the State of Kentucky
By

PAUL OBERST*

and

THoMAs LEwis**

Introduction
The Commonwealth of Kentucky is immune from suit in its
own courts except as the legislature consents. This is a general
proposition of law that has been accepted from the beginning of
our history as a state. The first Constitution provided that the
General Assembly should direct by law in what manner and in
what courts the Commonwealth should be sued,' but in 161 years
it has never done so. 2 As a result, when the Commonwealth
breaches its contract with the citizen or injures him by the negligent operation of its motor vehicle he cannot bring suit against
the government as if it were an individual or a corporation. The
immunity exists because the Commonwealth is a sovereign, as
every lawyer knows; his client, the injured citizen, seldom thinks
that this makes much sense.
There are breaches in the wall of immunity. In the absence
of any general waiver by the legislature of the Commonwealth's
immunity, there have been four legal devices by which some injured persons have been able to obtain redress against the Commonwealth. They are:
(1) The Judicial Suit against "Officers" and "Agencies"
(2) The Judicial Suit for Compensation for Having Taken
(Reverse Eminent Domain)
(8) The Special Act of the Legislature
(4) The Administrative Board of Claims
* A.B. Evansville College, LL.B. University of Kentucky, LL.M. University
of Michigan. Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.
*0 Third year law student; Editor-in-Chief, Kentucky Law Journal.
1
Ky. CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (1792). The provision in the Constitution of
1797 is almost identical. Ky. CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 6 (1797).
2
That such a law might be enacted general in its terms, and applicable to
every controversy between the sovereign and subject, may be conceded. We
understand such a law does exist in some of the States. But the General Assembly of this State has never exercised its right to pass such a law, although
clothed by express constitutional authority to do so, it has persistently declined
to exercise the authority, and enact such a law." Commonwealth v. Haly, 106 Ky.
716, 718, 51 S.W. 480 (1899). See also Daniel's Adm'r. v. Hoofnel, 287 Ky. 884,
155 S.W. 2d 469 (1941).
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All four of these remedies exist today. They are partly overlapping and partly complementary, and taken together they constitute a considerable breach in the defense of governmental immunity. It is the purpose of these articles to examine the immunity doctrine and then consider each of the above remedies.
An effort will be made to describe the availability and scope of
each remedy and the procedural problems arising under it for the
practical information of the bar. In addition some criticism of
the cases and comparison of legislative and administrative procedures will be made in the interests of improving the administration of justice.
This first article deals with the origins and basis of the
doctrine of commonwealth immunity and the use of suits against
"officers" and "agencies" to circumvent that immunity. The
second article, which will be published in the January issue,
will deal with the use of "reverse eminent domain" suits to obtain
damages against the Commonwealth for trespass to land. The
third article, which will appear in the March issue, will deal
with the use of special acts of the legislature and claims in the
administrative Board of Claims to recover damages-chiefly in.
tort-against the Commonwealth. It is believed that the series
will give a complete picture of the available remedies against the
Commonwealth, such as they are, and in addition by their very
inadequacy point to the need for developing a well-thought-out
scheme of governmental responsibility in the Commonwealth.
The Legal Basis of the Immunity of the Commonwealth
The immunity of the state from suit is a well established concept of public law in the United States. The justification which
was ordinarily given for it in the early cases was historical: since
the King was not suable in the ordinary courts in England at the
time of the Revolution, the sovereign states were therefore immune from suit in their own courts without their consent. 3 It is
probable that the real reason for the almost universal acceptance
of this reasoning was the fear that the new and financially shaky
4
state governments might be overwhelmed with judgments.
'Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36

YALE L. J. 1, 23 (1926).
'Gehllorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Government, 47
COL. L. REv. 722 (1947).
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The Kentucky courts did not have to work out the Commonwealth's immunity by the use of English judicial precedents. A
ready basis for immunity was found in the provisions of the first
and second Constitutions that "the legislature shall direct by law
in what manner and in what courts, suits may be brought against
the Commonwealth."' ; Since the Constitution provided that the
legislature should direct in what manner the Commonwealth
could be sued, the court could hold that the Constitution by implication prohibited any suit without legislative direction.6 The
word "shall" was treated as merely "directory," not mandatory,
and the provision was not "self-executing." 7 Subsequently, in the
Constitutions of 1850 and 1890, the language of the provision for
legislative direction of suits was changed from "shall" to "may,"
making the wording purely permissive.8 The Debates of the 1890
convention make it clear that the convention deliberately chose
the permissive language so that the legislature would be left free
to prefer Kentucky creditors over "these foreigners" at its absolute
discretion.0
While the immunity rule has most often been referred to the
provisions of the Constitution, the Court of Appeals has also

recognized sovereign immunity as a part of the common law of
the Commonwealth. Perhaps the strongest statement is in Com-

monwealth v. Wilder, where the court said: "This immunity
came down to us as a part of the fundamental common law and

is only indirectly contained in the Constitution." 10

CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 4 (1792); Ky. CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 6 (1797).
'See Divine v. Harvie, 28 Ky. (7 T. B. Mon.) 489 (1828): "Although the
constitution has declared that 'The General Assembly shall direct by law in
what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the Commonwealth', yet that body has never complied with that direction; but has hitherto
kept in their own power the granting of justice to creditors of the State on
petition. This voluntary grant of the State to individuals is the only judgment
and execution to which the State is subject."
"Cf. the very different treatment given the provision that property may not
be taken without just compensation, which is the "self-executing" origin of the
reverse eminent domain suits considered in the second article of this series.
'KY.

'Ky. CONST. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 (1850); KY. CONST. Sec. 281 (1890).
'IV DEBATES, CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION 1890, pp. 4700-4701.

See

Oberst, The Board of Claims Act of 1950, 89 Ky. L. J. 85, 86 (1950).
" Kentucky State Park Commission v. Wilder, 260 Ky. 190, 192, 84 S.W. 2d
88, 89 (1935). See also Zoeller v. State Board of Agriculture, 163 Ky. 446, 178
S.W. 1148 (1915) which describes immunity of the state as "an elementary principle of law".
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The "Practical"Reasons for Immunity
The Court of Appeals has tended to give the "practical" rather
than the "historical" reason for the immunity when it discusses
the basis of the rule. In Divine v. Harvie," the earliest case involving the immunity of the Commonwealth, the court refused
to allow the plaintiff to satisfy a judgment against his debtor by
attaching funds which the state had appropriated to the debtor.
The court pointed out that
Government, as a sovereign, may contract with whom she
will, and the credit, which she gives by her obligation, may
be, and frequently is, the only credit which her contractor
possesses. If that credit can be directed to other debts, instead of supplies of the government, against the will of her
contractors, injury to the government and disgrace to the
officer may be the consequence. It would be a mortifying
circumstance, to see a member of the legislature rendered
unable to pay his sustenance, while attending on its session,
because a creditor who never dealt on the credit of the fund
should by injunction, detain his
compensation, on which he
12
obtained credit with his host.
Where a "charitable" institution of the state was sued, the
court denied liability with a neat blending of the doctrines of
sovereign immunity and the diversion of charitable trust funds.
Williamson v. Louisville Industrial School of Reforrn3 involved
an institution which the court described as "an agency of the
State . . . maintained by taxation and state aid," but the court
placed its reliance on the trust fund theory, saying
If the funds of these institutions are to be diverted from
their intended beneficent purposes by law suits and judgments for damages for negligent or malicious servants, their
usefulness-indeed
their existence-will soon be a thing of
14
the past.
As recently as 1930, in Taylor v. Westerfield 5 judge Dietzman approved the exemption of the sovereign from liability as
"sound and unobjectionable," and said that "if [taxes] could be
"28
"Id.
"95
,Id.
"233

Ky. (7 T. B. Mon.) 439 (1828).
at 444.
Ky. 251, 24 S.W. 1065 (1894).
at 253, 24 S.W. at 1066.
Ky. 619, 26 S.W. 2d 557 (1930).
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diverted to the payment of damage claims the more important
work of government . . . would be seriously impaired, if not
totally destroyed."' 6 One of the baldest statements of the "practical" reason behind the immunity rule appeared in the same
case. Rejecting the line of cases extending the sovereign immunity to independent road contractors, Judge Dietzman remarked that those cases were based on a public policy that was
in short just this:
In order for the public to get its work done as cheaply as
possible, it is better for the individual to suffer the damage
which may be caused him in the negligent prosecution of
the work than that the public should be called upon to
sustain it by having to pay a contractor more to get the
work done in order that he
may protect himself against loss
17
by reason of such claims.
A notion that it is better for an individual to bear an injury
inflicted on him by the wrongdoing of the state than that the
cost of government should increase a penny does not comport
with present-day ideas of equal justice under law. In an era of
$70,000,000 budgets the picture of state institutions wrecked by
a few tort claims seems to be a little overdrawn, and the threat
that government might halt because a member of the legislature
had been thrown out of his lodgings when his per diem was
attached is even more inrealistic.' 8
Suits Against "Officers" and "Agencies"
Some relief against the immunity of the Commonwealth has
been afforded by suits against state officers and agencies in the
ordinary courts. In these cases the Commonwealth is not namedas a party defendant, the officers or agencies being sued instead,
although the interests of the state may be involved. The question
of the personal liability of public officers for tort damages will not
be considered in this series.' 9 Our present concern is the extent
'lId. at 621, 26 S.W. 2d at 558.
' Id. at 622, 26 S.W. 2d at 558.
' So unrealistic that the legislature has expressly allowed garnishment and
attachment of official salaries. See p. 89, infra.
" It has been generally said that an officer who commits a tort is individually
liable as if he were a private individual, but that is far from true. Not only do
we find complete immunity of the judiciary, but even officers performing administrative functions have considerable immunity; e. g., an officer is not liable for
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to which suits will lie against officers and agents to compel or
enjoin official actions, including the payment of the state's money.
The first Kentucky case in which the immunity of the Commonwealth was considered was on its face a bill in equity against
officers of the state. In Divine v. Harvie,2 ° a creditor sought to
subject to satisfaction of a judgment money appropriated to his
debtor by the General Assembly. His creditor's bill ran, not
against the Commonwealth as such, but against the Auditor and

Treasurer. The court held that the bill could not be maintained
against the state nor could it be sustained as a bill against the
Auditor and Treasurer since there was no claim against them as

individuals.
The court was careful to distinguish the case from the famous
United States Supreme Court case of Osborn v. Bank of the
United States,"' the leading case on immunity of the states.22 In
that case the Supreme Court affirmed a decree ordering the Treasurer of the State of Ohio to pay back certain money illegally collected from the Bank 23 for an unconstitutional tax.2 4 The Court
rejected contentions of the State of Ohio that it had a direct interest in the controversy and that the suit was substantially one
against the state. It observed that the state was not a party of

torts of his subordinates, Ketterer's Adm'r v. State Bd. of Control, 131 Ky. 287,
115 S.W. 200 (1909). Where the law imposes personal liability on the officer
the result is rather unsatisfactory from the standpoint of the individual, the officer
and the public. See GELLHORN, ADmNisrn'ATV LAw-CAsEs AND CoinlmNTs
297 (2d
ed. 1947).
S23 Ky. (7 T. B. Mon.) 439 (1828).
222 U. S. 738 (1824).
-The question in the Osborn case was immunity from suit in federal courts
under the Eleventh Amendment rather than common law immunity generally, but
little is made of this distinction in the cases.
' The state of Ohio bad imposed a tax of $100,000 on the bank. When the
bank refused to pay, Osborn, the State Auditor, and Harper, his agent, collected
the sum by force from specie in the vaults of the bank as the statute directed,
and delivered the money to Curry, the State Treasurer. Curry was succeeded by
Sullivan. In a suit by the bank, the Circuit Court issued a decree against all three
officials, directing them to refrain from enforcing the Act and to restore the money
to the bank. The State Treasurer refusing, he was committed for contempt and
on a writ of sequestration commissioners of the Court took the keys of the Treasurer and entered the Treasury and removed $98,000. I WAmEN, TrE SUPRMFNE
CouRT iN U. S. I-hsToRY 529-530, 533-534 (rev. ed. 1928).
'The act was passed on Feb. 8, 1819, the tax to be levied Sept. 15, 1819.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U. S. 316 (1819) holding state taxes on the bank
invalid was handed down March 6, 1819. See I WARmEN, THE SUPrMEe CoURT
ix U. S. HisToRY 511, 528 (rev. ed. 1928).
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record, and then treated the suit as one against an individual
trespasser,2 5 rather than against the state or its official.
If one compares the Kentucky garnishment case with the
Ohio bank case, he might feel that Ohio had more real interest
in the dispute over $100,000 in taxes lodged in her treasury than
the State of Kentucky had in the garnishment of a small sum of
money held for payment to a contractor. But that would ignore
the whole "principle" underlying the cases-the distinction be-

tween authorized acts and unauthorized acts, and between official
action and unlawful trespass.
That this principle afforded, or could afford, any satisfactory
basis for drawing a line between cases of suability and nonsuability is doubtful. " Certainly subsequent Kentucky cases which
have attempted to perpetuate this distinction draw a rather uncertain line between permissible suits against officers and suits
against officers which are forbidden because they are essentially
attempts to evade the rule against nonsuability of the Commonwealth. The "rule" as formulated by Judge Carroll is as follows:
a suit will lie against the agents of the State to compel
them to do something the State authorizes them to do or
restrain them from doing something that the State does not
authorize them to do, when it is necessary to compel or
restrain, as the case may be, to prevent injury or injustice
to the complaining party. 27
...

zOsborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U. S. 738, 868 (1824). The
Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, held that since the state of Ohio
was not a party on the record, the suit was not one against the state "in the view
of the Constitution." The Court having jurisdiction in a suit against the officers,
the real question was said to be whether they had a real interest or were only
nominal parties. The Court considered the case as one in which an individual
was in possession of certain money of the bank, kept separate and apart in specific
form. The money had been obtained by unlawful trespass, since "defendants
could derive neither authority nor protection" from the unconstitutional statutes,
and a decree was proper to prevent the irreparable injury which would occur if
the defendants were allowed to mingle the specific funds with the money in the
Treasury. Thus the action was treated as one between two citizens in which the
state was attempting to intervene, and the intervention was denied because the
state could show no legal interest. The unconstitutionality of this statute was
used in two ways-to deprive the officer of the immunity arising from any official
character of his acts and to deprive the state of any lawful interest in the controversV.
The "principle" reminds one of the primitive efforts of the courts to control
administrative authority over property by the use of actions for conversion and
trespass. The question on this judicial review of administrative action was not one
of 'reasonableness" or "substantial evidence" but "did the horse in fact have
glanders?" Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1890).
' Reliance Mfg. Co. v. Bd. of Prison Comm'rs, 161 Ky. 135, 147, 170 S.W.
941, 946 (1914).
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It is doubtful whether the "rule" is very helpful. Perhaps
Judge Carroll was being more candid when he said:
Many cases have been written on this subject, and a number of the leading ones have been called to our attention
by counsel as supporting their respective contentions. The
line of suability and non-suability in many of these cases is
very obscure, and it may be admitted that it is often difficult to make a substantial distinction between cases in
which the right to sue has been allowed and cases in which
it has been denied. Generally, however, the way is endeavored to be simplified by the facts of each particular
case, and the distinctions
as a rule turn on the construction
28
given the facts.
Construing the facts of each particular case may "simplify
the way" for the court in making its decision but it does not advance legal analysis very far. Despite Judge Carroll's warning
of the difficulties of the task, it is hoped that something may be
gained by attempting to classify the situations in which suits
against officers have been permitted and those in which they
have been dismissed as essentially suits against the state. Several
lines of classification suggest themselves. The cases might be
classified according to remedy: mandamus, prohibition, injunction, mandatory injunction, specific performance, damages, or
equity action for restitution or reformation, all of which have
been used. They might be classified according to the officer who
is made defendant: auditor, treasurer, governor,29 various state
boards and commissions, county officials, municipal officials,
school officials, all of whom have been sued. It is believed, however, that it will be more useful to classify the cases according to
the substantive nature of the claim-i.e. whether it is a claim
sounding in contract, tort, or quasi-contract. Among the advantages is the fact that it focuses attention on the problem of the
scope of liability of the nonsuable state which is our purpose
here and helps to distinguish all those cases of review of unconstitutional or unreasonable administrative action in enforcing
2

Id. at 144, 170 S.W. at 944.
In some states the governor is immune from suit, but the Court of Appeals

has held that the governor of Kentucky is suable in a number of cases. Cochran
v. Beckham, Gov., 28 K. L. R. 370, 89 S.W. 262 (1905); Traynor v. Beckham,
25 K. L. R. 284, 74 S.W. 1105 (1903); and see Gordon v. Morrow, Gov., 186
Ky. 718, 218 S.W. 258 (1920); Haley v. Cochran, 31 K. L. R. 505, 102 S.W. 852
(1907).
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regulatory or tax statutes which are more properly part of the
subject of ordinary administrative law-judicial review of administrative action."0
Contract Obligations of the Commonwealth
The Commonwealth may enter into contractual relations by
an express contract between the individual and officials acting
for the state. In addition, purchase of materials and compensation
of state employees for their services by salary and fees give rise
to relationships similar to that of contract implied in fact.3 ' Some
relief has been afforded in contract cases through the use of suits
against officers to compel them to perform state contracts. The
legal legerdemain by which this is accomplished is the theory
that the state has not breached its contract; some officer is unlawfully failing to carry out duties and an action against him to
compel him to act is not a suit against the state at all.32 An even
more tenuous distinction between creating liability and enforcing
liability was advanced in Board of Councilmen v. State Highway
Commission.m There the court allowed an action for mandamus
to compel the Commission to carry out a contract to maintain a
street, saying:
It is to be observed that in cases of this kind a distinction
is drawn between suits seeking to create or increase the
liability of the state, and suits seeking to compel administrative officers to satisfy a liability theretofore created-one
to establish a right and the other to satisfy a right already
created under law.
In the instant case, according to the allegation of the
petition, the liability of the Commonwealth was created by
the contract. It is now a matter of enforcing the contract.3 4
' There is no clear-cut line between the subject of claims against the state
and scope of judicial review of administrative action, and sometimes it gets down
to two ways of looking at the same thing. Cf. footnote 26 supra: When a health
officer is sued for conversion for summary destruction of property it may be regarded as a suit against an officer or as a form of judicial review of administrative
action. Judicial review of administrative action is usually concerned with the
control of administrative discretion-but claims against the state may be, too.
'A third situation which may arise-a quasi-contract claim for goods or
services rendered in the absence of any contract, ex-press or implied in fact-is
considered under the head of restitution, infra p. 79.
' Baldwin v. Comm'rs of Sinking Fund, 74 Ky. 417 (1875).
236 Ky. 258, 32 S.W. 2d 1008 (1930).
"Id. at 260, 82 S.W. 2d at 1011.
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Mandamus against the officer is not the only remedy. In
Reliance Mfg. Co. v. Board of Prison Commrs., 3 the court sustained the right of a contractor to an injunction against the Prison
Board which had refused to renew a contract according to its
terms, and in Baldwin v. Commrs. of the Sinking Fund,3" specific
performance was granted to compel the Commissioners to carry
out a contract of sale and deliver specific stock held by them.
In none of these cases, of course, was there a judgment for
damages for breach of contract, payable out of the State Treasury,
and the fictitious distinction between suits against officers and
suits against the state could be maintained. Even the fiction
broke down in the second Frankfort Councilmen case. The action
was originally a mandamus action to compel the Highway Commission to carry out a contract to construct a street, but after the
city had constructed the disputed street itself the action was
amended to a claim for the sum of $50,000 for that portion of
the cost which the Highway Commission had agreed to bear. The
trial court dismissed, but the Court of Appeals reversed, saying
the action was not a suit for damages but was brought to compel
state officers to perform a ministerial duty required by statute.3 7
On remand the trial court entered a judgment requiring the Highway Commission to pay $50,000, which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals.3" Judge Dietzman in a dissenting opinion argued
that the judgment did not enforce the contract but awarded
damages for the breach.3"
If the individual and officials acting for the state get into a
dispute over the state's duty to pay money on such an obligation,
the initial remedy is the administrative one of resort to the finance
officers of the state. The individual may submit his claim as a
statement of indebtedness on the proper form and if the Department of Finance finds it correct it will issue a warrant.40 Where
there is a disputed claim against the state or any budget unit
'161 Ky. 135, 170 S.W. 941 (1914).
74 Ky. 417 (1875).
"Bd. of Councilmen of City of Frankfort v. State Highway Comm., 236 Ky.

253, 32 S.W. 2d 1008 (1930).
's State Highway Comm. v. Bd. of Councilmen of the City of Frankfort, 245
Ky. 799, 54 S.W. 2d 315 (1932).

The decision was 4-3, with Dietzman, Thomas

and Rees dissenting.
Id. at 817, 54 S.W. 2d at 324. Judge Dietzman pointed out that the street
which the city built was not the street that the Highway Dept. bad contracted to
build-nor was it in fact anything like it.
"'Ky. IEtv. STAT. 45.210.
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thereof, the Department of Finance is authorized to compromise,
with the approval of the Attorney-General. 41 If no compromise
can be reached which is satisfactory to the claimant, he is then
faced with the rule that no action may be maintained against
the Commonwealth without its consent. He may, however, bring
suit in the form of an action against the accounting officers of the
Commonwealth to compel them to issue a warrant to pay the
claim. 42 This is not an action against the Commonwealth for
"damages" authorized by the General Assembly, but is a suit
against an officer to compel him to perform an official duty to
satisfy a money obligation of the state.43 The chief problem for
the claimant here has been to make out a case of "plain duty" of
the officer to perform a "ministerial act," instead of to exercise
discretion. In the only case 44 found in which the claimant sought
to compel payment for goods furnished the state, the amount of
the claim had been fixed by the Secretary of State pursuant to
statute. Since the Auditor's duty was merely ministerial, mandamus was allowed. 5
Mandamus to compel payment of officers' salaries and fees
46
has been more common. In the leading case of Page v. Hardin
the court allowed a mandamus against the Auditor to compel
payment of claimant's salary, saying that the Auditor had no discretion to issue or not issue a warrant to pay an official salary.
The only question is who is the lawful officer, which is a matter
of law and a proper question for the judicial branch.' Of course,
"1Ky. REV.

STAT. 45.220.

"1Prior to 1934, the Auditor had the duty of drawing warrants to satisfy
claims (G. S. Ch. 15, Art. 1, Sec. 1; Carroll's K. S.304). In 1934 the claims
function was transferred to the Department of Finance, Ky. Acts 1936 (1st. ex.
sess.), Ch. 1; Ky. REv. STAT. 42.030, 44.010.

Cf. Hager, Auditor v. Sidebottom, 130 Ky. 687, 691, 113 S.W. 870, 871
(1908), where the court said: "The suit is practically one against the State. The
Auditor was defending for the State."
"Lindsey v. Auditor, 66 Ky. 231 (1867).
"The Auditor's duty must be equated to the duty of the Dept. of Finance.
The Auditor's duty under the current legislation is post-audit. Ky. REv. STAT.
43.010 et seq.
""Page, Second Auditor v. Hardin, 47 Ky. 648 (1848).
"Id. at 654. An exceptional case of an unliquidated salary claim was
Gordon v. Morrow, 186 Ky. 713, 218 S.W. 258 (1920), where the claimant had
been employed as a special attorney to collect inheritance taxes. The amount due
in attorney's fees was unascertained and the court said that mandamus could not
lie to compel payment of an undetermined "fair" fee. While denying relief by
mandamus, the opinion of the court suggested an ingenious alternative: the discharged attorney should move the trial court to refuse to allow substitution of
another lawyer as state tax attorney of record until the state had paid his claim
for attorney's fees.
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other legal questions have arisen in salary cases, but they have
also been disposed of as "matters of law" for the court.4" Even
where approval of the Governor was a condition of payment, his
0
approval was said to be a ministerial act. 49 In Reeves v. Talbot,5
the court held that the Commissioner had discretion to reject a
request for travel authorization, subject to review for abuse of
discretion. It found that he had not abused his discretion in rejecting the request but ordered him to issue his warrant because
his refusal had been based on a misconstruction of law. This case
makes it clear that mandamus will lie to compel officers to carry
out more than their "plain duty."
Where the legislature has appropriated no funds or the funds
upon which the claim is made have been exhausted, it would
seem that the Auditor could certainly have no "plain duty" to pay
the claim,"' whatever the equitable considerations might be. In
Hager v. Shuck,5 the court denied a salary claim in excess of the
departmental appropriation, saying that the Auditor cannot be
compelled to pay a claim unless the legislature had expressly appropriated the money.
Two interesting cases have thrown some doubt even on this
rule, however. In Talbot v. Burke,53 the court granted mandamus
for expenses of the County Assessor where the legislature had
authorized the expense but had failed to provide funds "through
4
the legiserror." In Miller Comm'r. of Finance v. Quertermous,5
lature had failed to appropriate sufficient funds for the support
of the state welfare institutions. The Commissioner of Welfare
filed a suit for mandamus to compel the approval of warrants for
necessary expenses and payment out of the General Fund. The
' 8 Smith v. Coulter, Auditor, 113 Ky. 74, 23 K. L. R. 2384, 67 S.W. 1 (1902)
(de jure officer until replaced); Buechele v. Petty, Sheriff, 265 Ky. 321, 96 S.W.
2d 1010 (1936) (interpretation of Const. Sec. 161).
" Cochran v. Beckham, Gov., 28 K. L. R. 370, 89 S.W. 262 (1905).

5'289 Ky. 581, 159 S.W. 2d 52 (1941).
-He would have a plain duty not to pay the claim under Ky. CONST.
Sec. 230 ("No money shall be drawn from the State Treasury, except in pursuance
") and Ky. Rxv. STAT. 45.220 ('. . . The
of appropriations made by law..
Department of Finance shall not certify any claim to the State Treasurer until it

is satisfied that there is, in the appropriation to the budget unit against which the

claim is chargeable, a sufficient amount to pay the claim.. .

"120 Ky. 547, 87 S.W. 300 (1905).
-287 Ky. 187, 152 S.W. 2d 586 (1941).
304
3 Ky. 733, 202 S.W. 2d 389 (1947). See also Ross v. Gross, 800 Ky. 337,

188 S.W. 2d 475 (1945), a refund case, where the court refused to pass on the
question of whether claims for necessary state expenditures could be paid out of
the General Fund without an appropriation.
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court granted the mandamus and compelled the Commissioner
of Finance to pay out funds, unauthorized and unappropriated,
on the grounds of "inexorable necessity coupled with inescapable
responsibility."'' r The court disposed of the constitutional prohibition against withdrawal of funds without legislative appropriation by saying that the legislature did not necessarily have
exclusive control and it was merely intended as a "safer and more
expedient" means to an end. Where the legislature fails, the court
will step in. This thought, projected further (which it will not
be), could provide a basis for satisfying all claimants.
In any event, these cases open up a vista of judicial review of
the administrative action of accounting officers which is not restricted to concepts of "plain duty." Perhaps the day is approaching when the court vill direct compromise or payment of claims
by the Department of Finance if it feels it should be paid in the
exercise of sound judgment.
In summary, it appears that when the state has breached a
contract, although no action can be maintained against the Commonwealth for damages for the breach, it is often possible to obtain relief by suing state officers for specific relief, including the
payment of money. Relief will depend on whether the court will
enter a decree controlling the "unauthorized acts" of an officer
or compelling his performance of some "clear legal duty." Thus
the attention of the court in breach of contract cases is artificially
focused on questions of lack of authority and want of discretion
instead of on the supposedly fundamental principles of whether
the state is being sued or not and whether the treasury is being
threatened. The operation of the state government can in fact be
considerably affected and the treasury can be depleted if the
court can be persuaded that a case of "unauthorized act" or "clear
legal duty" is made out. In the long run, it is submitted, the
interests of the state as well as those dealing with it would be
better served if it were free to contract and respond in damages
for the breach to the same extent as individuals. Certainly it was
a far more serious interference with the operation of the state
government for a court to grant specific performance of a con-

Id. at 735,202 S.W. 2d 391.
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tract to work prisoners than it would have been for it to have
given judgment for money damages for the breach. 6
Tort Claims
The Commonwealth and its agencies are clearly immune from
any action for damages based on tort.57 In addition to the general
rule of immunity from suit there is an additional hurdle in the
concept that the Commonwealth is also immune from liability
for tort. Two reasons are given: one that there can be no liability
for injuries inflicted in the performance of "governmental functions"58 (on an analogy to municipal corporations law); the other,

that it would divert a trust fundr0 (on an analogy to immunity of
charitable institutions). Of course, the officer may be personally
liable for damages, but the suit to control the acts of state officers, sometimes helpful in contract matters, cannot afford relief
against most tortious conduct. The deed is done and there is no
"pre-existing liability," or "plain duty" to pay which can afford
the basis for mandamus against an accounting officer.
There is one situation, however, in which a suit against an
officer can afford relief from what is essentially a Commonwealth
tort, and that is the injunction against nuisance.60 Even though
the action controlled was official action on behalf of the Commonwealth, the court will take the view that the suit is against
the individual officer only. The Commonwealth does not ex-

See Reliance Mfg. Co. v. Bd. of Prison Comm'rs, 161 Ky. 135, 170 S.W.

941 (1914).

' Recovery was denied in Williamson v. L'ville Industrial School of Reform,
95 Ky. 251, 24 S.W. 1065 (1894) (inmate beaten by another inmate); Leavell v.
Western Kentucky Asylum for the Insane, 122 Ky. 218, 91 S.W. 671 (1906)
(injury by lunatic employee negligently employed in laundry); Ketterer's Adm'r
v. State Board of Control, 131 Ky. 287, 115 S.W. 200 (1909) (insane inmate
beaten to death by employees); Zoeller v. State Board of Agriculture, 163 Ky. 446,
173 S.W. 1143 (1915) (child trampled by mounted musician at state fair);
Norwood v. Ky. Confederate Home, 172 Ky. 300, 189 S.W. 225 (1916) (sewage
dumped into plaintiff's creek).
'Zoeller v. State Bd. of Agriculture, 163 Ky. 446, 173 S.W. 1143 (1915).
'Williamson v. Louisville Industrial School of Reform, 95 Ky. 251, 24 S.W.
1065 (1894); Leavell v. Western Ky. Asylum for the Insane, 122 Ky. 213, 91
S.W. 671 (1906); Ketterer's Adm'r v. State Board of Control, 131 Ky. 287, 115
S.W. 200 (1909).
e Herr v. Cent. Ky. Lunatic Asylum, 97 Ky. 458, 30 S.W. 971 (1895)
(sewage); Anderson v. State Highway Commission, 252 Ky. 696, 68 S.W. 2d 5
(1934) (flooding).

CLAmns AGAN sT STATE

pressly authorize its officers to commit nuisances; the tortious
conduct is "unauthorized" conduct and can be enjoined.0 1
While there can be no action against the Commonwealth to
recover damages for the interference if the nuisance is only temporary, 2 if it is permanent it may also amount to a "taking" of
property for which a constitutional suit against the Commonwealth will lie. So many special questions arise in connection
with suits for taking that they are treated in a separate article,
which will appear in the January issue of the Law Journal.
Restitution
The Court of Appeals has said rather broadly that "claims
against the treasury do not arise by implication. 0 The usual pattern of budget, appropriation, warrant and mandamus does not
allow much place for the enforcement of claims for goods and
services involving some fraud, mistake, illegality or duress.
Mandamus will not issue unless there is a "plain duty" to pay a
claim, and there is no plain duty of the state finance officers to
pay claims on equitable considerations. Doubtless such claims
are sometimes paid in the exercise of administrative discretion,
but if approval is withheld by the finance officers, there is little
chance of judicial relief. When a suit for mandamus is brought,
the issue is one of "authority", "legality" or "discretion", and
questions of duty of the state to make restitution are not
reached."4
The crux of the problem is often the safeguarding of the appropriation power. No money can be drawn from the treasury
except in pursuance of appropriations and appropriations can be
made only by the General Assembly.6 5 Where no appropriation
has been made or an appropriation has been exhausted there can
'Anderson v. State Highway Comm., 252 Ky. 696, 699, 68 S.W. 2d 5
(1934). The same reasoning is used in holding officers personally liable while
exempting the state.
" Norwood v. Ky. Confederate Home, 172 Ky. 800, 189 S.W. 225 (1916).
Hager v. Sidebottom, 130 Ky. 687, 113 S.W. 870 (1908).
" Cf. MEcHEm, TnE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OrImcms 556 (1890), "It
is a necessary conclusion from the principles already stated that the public ...
can be bound by the acts and contracts of its officers and agents only when such
officer or agent has acted strictly within the scope of his authority as created,
conferred and defined by law, and that it is not bound where such officer or agent
has transcended or exceeded his lawful and legitimate powers."
' KY. CONST. See. 230; Ky. REv. STAT. 41.110, 45.020.
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be no plain duty to pay. 66 Similarly, where some condition imposed by statute has not been complied with, no duty to pay
arises.67 A number of exceptions have been made to these rules
in cases in which the court has spelled out a duty to pay in the
absence of any specific appropriation because of a continuing appropriation, legislative oversight, or "inexorable necessity".6 8
The only cases found in which the Commonwealth was forced
to make restitution for services rendered under mistake or duress
were counterclaims. In Commonwealth v. Barker0 the Commonwealth sought to recover from the defendant attorney certain fees
illegally paid for collection of back taxes. The defendant's
counterclaim for the value of his services was allowed, the court
saying:
Certainly it will not be contended that the appellee was
not in honor and good conscience entitled to be remunerated for his valuable services; and if the question here
involved was between individuals nobody would have the
slightest doubt of the right of the appellee, as a matter of
law, to be remunerated for his services. The Commonwealth cannot be permitted to allow one to go on year after
year, laying out his money for its benefit, and giving his
whole time and services for its advantage, and, after paying
him for such services, then, after a long period of time, to
recover it from him as money paid under a mistake of law,
and leave him without any sort of recourse.1 0
It is submitted that it would not be an extraordinary extension
of the theory of these cases if the court directed payment of
claims against the state for restitution in proper cases.
Where the claim is for the return of money paid the state
'Hager

v. Shuck, 120 Ky. 547, 87 S.W. 300 (1905); Petty, Sheriff v. Cole-

man, Auditor, 242 Ky. 187, 45 S.W. 2d 1041 (1932).
'Wilson v. Bradley, Gov., 105 Ky. 52, 48 S.W. 166 (1898)

(fees and expenses of returning fugitive will not be paid where foreign state refused to honor
warrant of extradition); Hager v. Sidebottom, 130 Ky. 687, 113 S.W. 870 (1908)
(reward "earned" by plaintiff was void, since Governor had not exercised the
discretion in offering it.).
I For a case of continuing appropriation, see Shannon, Auditor v. Dean, 279

Ky. 279, 130 S.W. 2d 812 (1939); failure to provide funds through error, Talbott,
Com'r of Finance v. Burke, Tax Collector, 287 Ky. 187, 152 S.W. 2d 586 (1941);
"inexorable necessity" dispensing with need for legislative appropriation, Miller,
Comm'r of Finance v. Quertermous, 304 Ky. 733, 202 S.W. 2d 389 (1947).
126 Ky. 200, 103 S.W. 303, 31 K. L. R. 648 (1907).

1
0Id. at 207, 103 S.W. at 305. See also Comm. v. Todd, 72 Ky. 708 (1873)
(impairment of value of prison-keeper's contract). For a special act allowing

restitution see Comm. v. Lyon, 24 K. L. R. 1747, 72 S.W. 323 (1903).
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for taxes, fees and deposits, the issue is free from any troublesome questions of spending authority, and restitution principles
have developed more readily. Of course, the Commonwealth's
immunity from suit is a problem even here.7 It could be argued,
on an analogy to the contracts and torts cases, that the officer
collecting money not due under the law collected it as an individual and not on behalf of the state,72 but such a theory has
seldom been needed in Kentucky.
The legislature nearly a century ago made provision for administrative refund of taxes overpaid. An act of March 9, 1854,
provided that
When it shall appear to the auditor of public accounts, that
money has been paid into the public treasury for taxes,
when no such taxes were in fact due, he shall issue his warrant on the treasury for such money so improperly paid, in
73
behalf of the person who paid the same ....
The only provisos were that the application had to be made
within two years of the time the taxes were paid and that no
other taxes were due from the taxpayer. No provision was made
for judicial action, and no distinction was made between voluntary and involuntary payments. Although the statute might have
been interpreted as conferring a discretionary duty on the Auditor
the court held that the Auditor had a "plain duty" under the
statute to refund taxes not due and that a writ of mandamus
would issue to compel the Auditor to make a refund.74 The suit
was not against the state, but was a suit against an officer to
compel him to perform a legal duty. Judicial enforcement was
subject to judicially imposed limitations, however. Where the
over-payment was a result of overassessment, it was held the
"The Restatement of Restitution Sec. 75 deals with restitution of void taxes
and assessments paid without mistake of fact, but Comment b warns that "itis not
within the scope of the restatement of this Subject to state the conditions under
which a State permits suits against itself'. In case of mistake of fact (Sec. 19h)
or mistake of law (Sec. 45), there is the same problem.
"See Ill.
Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, infra p. 87, where the court treated deposited securities as being in the custody of the officer rather than the state and
Ross v. Gross, 300 Ky. 337, 188 S.W. 2d 475 (1945) where certain fees and
receipts were ordered to be refunded to the county officers because "the payment
into the State Treasury did not vest the state with title thereto or a right to its
custody".

" Ky. Acts, 1854, Ch.848.

' The first case found was Bank of Commerce of L'ville v.Stone, Aud., 108
Ky.427,56 S.'W. 683 (1900).
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Auditor could not be compelled to make a refund because he had
no authority to correct an assessment.75 An equitable limitation
was engrafted onto the statute by the court so that no suit could

be maintained for taxes "voluntarily" paid." Taxes were said to
be paid "involuntarily" only where failure to pay could result in
distraint of property,7 7 or where a corporation could not function
until the tax was paid. 78 In Greene v. Taylor, the court construed
the statute as requiring repayment regardless of whether the pay-

ment was voluntary or involuntary, provided it was made under

mistake, 79 thus substituting one branch of restitution for another.
In Craig v. Sec. Prod. & Ref. Co.80 the court expressly over-

ruled the earlier cases and interpreted the statute as directing
the return of all money paid into the treasury as taxes by taxpayers through mistake, inadvertence, misapprehension of the

law, or under void or unenforceable statutes, whether payment
was voluntary or not. Said Judge Sampson:
We can think of no reason why the state should not be required to live up to the same moral standards demanded of
individuals and repay money received by it through mistake
or inadvertence. Any other rule is unconscionable and bad
in morals if not actually dishonest. The state should not,
"German Security Bank v. Coulter, Auditor, Louisville City Nat'l Bank v.
Coulter, Auditor, 112 Ky. 577, 66 S.W. 425 (1902); Couty v. Bosworth, Aud.,
160 Ky. 312, 169 S.W. 742 (1914); Greene v. E. H. Taylor & Sons, 184 Ky. 739,
212 S.W. 925 (1919) (dictum); Craig, Aud. v. Security Prod. & Ref. Co., 189
Ky. 565, 225 S.W. 729 (1920) (dictum).
"German Sec. Bank v. Coulter, Aud., 112 Ky. 577, 66 S.W. 425 (1902);
Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Bosworth, Aud., 169 Ky. 824, 185 S.W. 125 (1916).
' German See. Bank v. Coulter, supra note 68; Greene v. E. H. Taylor &
Sons, 184 Ky. 739, 212 S.W. 925 (1919). The reason for turning recovery on
whether the taxes paid were collectible by distraint or only by suit was given by
the court in Greene v. Taylor as follows: "...if the taxes can be collected only
by suit, and the taxpayer thus has an opportunity for a day in court, but instead
of resisting the payment, pays it, the payment is voluntary, and the one, paying,
cannot recover it." Greene v. Taylor, supra at p. 745.
'Louisville Gas & Elec. v. Bosworth, supra, note 68.
" The court derived the requirement of mistake from the "well-established
doctrine as applying to transactions of individuals" and a reference to mistaken
payment in the proviso. Said the court: ". . . although the statute does not, in
terms, make necessary the existence of a mistake or compulsion to enable the taxpayer to reclaim the money, there must exist, in favor of the claimant, some
equitable ground upon which to entitle him to call into his service, the powers
and processes of the courts. If one, with a knowledge of the fact, that he did
not owe the tax, should voluntarily pay it into the treasury, upon what could be
base a right to ask a court, of equity, to exercise its powers and processes to
compel a return of it to him?" Green v. Taylor and Sons, 184 Ky. 739, 744, 212
S.W. 925, 927 (1919).
-189 Ky. 565, 225 S.W. 729 (1920). See also Craig, Auditor v. Frankfort
Dist. Co., 189 Ky. 616, 225 S.W. 731 (1920).
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merely because it has the power to declare the law, take to
itself money rightfully and in good conscience belonging to
its citizens and taxpayers without just return.81

A few years later, in Coleman, Aud. v. Inland Gas Co.82 the
court reversed itself once more and denied refund of an unconstitutional tax on the ground that payment was "voluntary". The
majority opinion, by Judge Logan, dismissed the rule of the Craig
case with the observation that it "sounds well and carries a high
moral tone," but is in conflict with the ancient common law principle that money voluntarily paid as taxes cannot be recovered
back although no tax was due. The conflict between the majority
and minority was so acute that some quotation from each is
justified. Said Judge Logan:
state governments have been slow indeed to open the
doors of their treasuries and allow money to pass therefrom
after it has once found lodgment within the governmental
vaults. This is as it should be. The state is the sovereign,
and its affairs must be conducted for the best interest and
welfare of the people. That calls for the expenditure of
large sums of money for governmental affairs, and such
sums of money can be obtained only through taxation. The
state should determine the amount which it will spend by
the probable income which it will receive. When the income is collected it is allocated to different funds. The state
uses the fund nearly always during the current year. It has
been universally held, unless a contrary conclusion was
forced by an iron clad statute, that no taxpayer should have
...

189 Ky. 565, 568, 225 S.W. 729, 731 (1920).
281 Ky. 637, 21 S.W. 2d 1030 (1929). The opinion specifically ovemled
the Craig cases and "if there is any other case holding that taxes voluntarily paid
may be recovered back under the provisions of See. 162 Ky. Stats., it is unsound
andwill not be followed". Id. at 644. One of the more amusing sidelights in the
Inland Gas case was the use by Judge Clay and Judge Logan of stare decisis and
the canons of statutory construction. Judge Clay argued that the law should not
change with the personnel of the court. Judge Logan retorted that "if the doctrine of stare decisis has any place in jurisprudence it should have been applied
when the attack was made on the long line of cases prior to 1920." Judge Logan
argued that reenactment of the 1854 refund statute as interpreted fixed its meaning. Judge Clay said (at p. 647): "The statute plainly provides for the refunding
of taxes 'when no such taxes were in fact due.' There is not a proviso, or a
sentence, or a clause, or a phrase, or a word, or a syllable, or even a punctuation
mark that in any way qualifies or limits the effect of the language used. Instances may arise where a statute is so unintelligible that words must be inserted
to give it effect, but that rule does not apply where there is no doubt as to the
meaning of the statute. Here the language is direct, certain, clear, explicit, unequivocal, and unmistakable in meaning. I doubt if there can be found among
the statutes of Kentucky, or the statutes of any other state, or the statutes of the
United States, a statute whose meaning is as clear as the one under consideration."
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the right to disrupt the government by demanding a refund
of his money whether paid legally or otherwise, unless the
sovereign was made to know at the time the money was
paid that the taxpayer
would insist that the money should
3
be refunded to him.1
Judges Clay and Willis dissented from the majority in the following rather picturesque language:
A gentleman will not retain money that does not belong to
him. The statute was enacted to enable the Commonwealth
to be a gentleman. Because of the great number of constitutional and legal restrictions, it is not often that such an
opportunity comes to the Commonwealth, and the statute
should not be construed so as to drag it down from that
high estate. Feeling that he should contribute his share to
the support of the government, and believing that the government will do the fair and honorable thing in case the
taxes are declared to be illegal, a good citizen usually pays
his taxes promptly and voluntarily. For this he is penalized
by a construction that does violence to the statute, while the
taxpayer whose voice of protest rings loudest in the corridors of the courthouse or state capitol
is made the sole
object of the law's tender solicitude.8 4
As to the purported hardship on the Commonwealth, Judge
Clay noted
The alleged hardship is wholly chimerical and without
foundation in fact. It is a matter of common knowledge
that taxes paid involuntarily or under protest are never set
aside in a special fund to await the decision of their legality.
On the contrary, they are distributed by the state just as
taxes paid voluntarily and without protest. Hence the situation of the state is precisely the same, whether the taxes
are protested or not. That being true, there is no ground
for the distinction and therefore no reason for disregarding
the statute.8 5
Two years later in Coleman, State Aud. v. ConsolidatedRealty
Co.,8" the court overruled the Inland Gas case to the extent that
it held that payment of the mortgage tax was voluntary and alId. at 640, 21 S.W. 2d at 1031.

14 Id. at 649, 21 S.W. 2d at 1035.
Id. at 647, 21 S.W. 2d at 1034.
239 Ky. 788, 40 S.W. 2d 387 (1931). Dietzman was the sole dissenter.
Judge Logan had left the court only a few months before the opinion was
handed down.
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lowed recovery of the tax. Apparently left untouched, however,
was the underlying rule of the Inland Gas case that if the payment of a tax is not in some sense involuntary it cannot be recovered.
In 1938 the legislature intervened to allow some relief to the
cheerful taxpayer. The act reorganizing the Department of Revenue authorized the Department to refund tax payments not due
or overpaid, regardless of whether the payment was made voluntarily or involuntarily, but the act expressly excepted ad valorem
taxes and taxes not due because the statute was held unconstitutional.8 In the 1942 codification of the statutes the refund provisions of the 1938 act were codified as KRS 134.580. The exceptions were codified as KRS 134.590, and a specific proviso
was added that refund should be made only when the ad valorem
or unconstitutional taxes were paid involuntarily.8 8
The 1938 legislation also made some changes in refund procedure. Formerly, refunds could be enforced by mandamus
against the Auditor or Department of Finance. The 1938 statute
conferred the duty of making refunds upon the Department of
Revenue. Since all Department of Revenue rulings are reviewable only under special statutory proceedings,8 9 the taxpayer
denied a refund by the Department must now petition the Kentucky Tax Commission for a refund within fifteen days and upon
its final decision has fifteen days in which to appeal to the Franklin Circuit Court. This remedy is exclusive and ousts the mandamus remedy where refund from the Department of Revenue is
sought. 90
Not all tax refunds are made by the Department of Revenue.
Under the Unemployment Compensation Act the Commission has
authority to refund contributions erroneously collected. 1 At first,
the Commission interpreted this as referring only to compulsory
contributions and refused to return voluntary contributions made
K Ky. Acts, 1938 (1st Ex. Sess.), Ch. 4, Sec. 6. Taxpayers who paid unconstitutional taxes were remitted to Ky. Stats. 162.
SThe Reviser's note to 184.590 states that the refund provision has been
limited to involuntary payment to comply with judicial construction. Thus the
word Judge Clay could not find anywhere in the Act of 1854 was finally written
in by the legislature eighty-eight years afterwards.
' See Ky. RmE. STAT. 131.125 which makes all rulings of the Department of
Revenue reviewable under the provisions of Ky. REv. STAT. 131.110 and 131.120.
'Ky. Rm,. STAT. 131.110.
" Ky.REv. STAT. 341.330.
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conditionally to reduce the contribution rate. When a taxpayer
brought an action for mandamus, the Court of Appeals, affirming
a judgment in favor of the taxpayer, said:
The statute did not extend any right or authority to the
Commonwealth or its bureau to deal unreasonably or unfairly or unjustly with the taxpayers.... It is not believed
that the legislature intended that the Commonwealth and
its commission could keep a citizen's money when freely
and voluntarily made conditionally, while they must refund
compulsory collections erroneously exacted.9 2
In Barnes v. Stearns,93 where the contribution was unconditional
but made under mistake of fact, the court also allowed the refund.
While distinguishing the Inland Gas case9 4 on the narrow ground
that it involved general revenue and was not binding in a case
involving the insurance fund, the court's opinion ended with a
strong statement from GreatAtlantic and Pacific Tea Company v.
Lexington:
Money paid without consideration and which in law,
honor, or good conscience was not payable ought in law,
honor and good conscience to be recoverable, and that rule
applicable to transactions between individuals should be
generally made applicable to municipalities and other governments. Only very compelling reasons of public policy
relieve the state and its subdivisions from being required to
live up to the same moral standards demanded of individuals and to repay taxes collected without authority of a
valid law. Even those reasons are being continually attacked as insufficient.95
Still another type of refund claim arises out of payment of
fees. Although "fair dealing" would seem to require the Commonwealth to return fees, as well as taxes, paid through mistake
or under duress, recovery was denied in the only case found. In
Commonwealth v. Ray,96 the plaintiff asserted that the Master
Commissioner of Jefferson County had wrongfully collected illegal
fees to the extent of $112,603.51 in 2700 sales of real estate and
"Barnes, Dir. v. Levy Bros., 295 Ky. 794, 1798, 175 S.W. 2d 495, 497 (1943).
"295 Ky. 812, 175 S.W. 2d 498 (1948).
"See note 74, supra.
295 Ky. 812, 817, 175 S.W. 2d 498, 500 (1943). Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Co. v. Lexington, 256 Ky. 595, 76 S.W. 2d 894 (1934) dealt with
refund of a municipal license tax paid by mistake or under a "constructive" fraud.
"275 Ky. 758, 122 S.W. 2d 750 (1938).
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asked that the sum be declared a trust fund in the hands of the
Auditor for the benefit of those who had contributed. The action
was dismissed on special demurrer and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Among the reasons given 97 was the absence of any statute
allowing the recoupment of illegally assessed fees.
Two cases were found involving refund of deposits. In Tate
v. Salmon 8 the plaintiff, suing in behalf of the policy-holders of
an insolvent insurance company, sought to recover $100,000 worth
of securities deposited with the State Treasurer to secure the
policies. The Court of Appeals held that the suit against the
State Treasurer was really a suit against the Commonwealth. In
Illinois Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt,9 9 the company, having withdrawn
from the state and reinsured all its risks, sought mandamus to
compel the return of its securities on deposit with the State
Treasurer. This time the court held that the action to recover
the deposit was not an action against the state, but was against
an officer who was a mere custodian and the state had no interest.
The court did not even allude to Tate v. Salmon, although it was
cited in the Attorney General's brief. The difference in result is
not wholly whimsical. A court willing to return a deposit to the
depositor might quail before the task of distributing it among the
policy-holders, but the result should not be made to depend upon
a non-existent distinction between a suit against the Commonwealth and a suit against an officer.
Finally a claim for refund may arise from an overpayment
made by an officer in settlement of his accounts with the state.
0° a prisonIn Commissioners of the Sinking Fund v. Theobald,'
keeper brought an action for restitution for over-payment against
the Commissioners. The suit was dismissed on the ground that
an agent is not liable for a fund after paying it over to his principal. The court suggested that Theobald's right of reclamation
lay against the state, if anywhere. 101
I The court also held that a representative suit could not be maintained, that
the judgment of the court approving the fees was res judicata, and that proper
venue was Jefferson County, if anywhere.
fs79 Ky.540 (1881).
123 Ky. 36, 93 S.W. 480 (1906).
1 56 Ky. 459 (1856).
o In the absence of any statute authorizing refund in such cases could suit
against the state be maintained? See Commonwealth v. Ray, note 96 supra.
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Real Property Actions
Where real property is involved, the courts have been less
willing to utilize the state immunity doctrine to cut off private
claims. This illustrated by the extent to which the court went
in Commissioners of the Sinking Fund v. Northern Bank of Kentucky 0 2 to find that a suit to enforce a mortgage against the state
was really a suit against the officers. The state had taken over a
railroad under a mortgage and sold it to a new company in exchange for its bonds and stock, deposited with the Commissioners
of the Sinking Fund. The Bank sued the Commonwealth and
the Commissioners to assert a lien under a prior mortgage. The
court held that the suit was not substantially against the Commonwealth but was merely against certain officers to compel them
to apply properly certain funds that did not equitably belong to
the state at all.'0 3 Solicitude for the owner of real property may
also help explain the origin of the constitutional suit for a taking
which will be discussed in the January issue.
There are limits to the state's suability even in property matters, however. In Ky. State Park Comm. v. Wilder,04 the plaintiff,
claiming an interest in the tract, brought suit against the State
Park Commission to compel a sale of Cumberland Falls State Park
and a division of the proceeds. The court dismissed the action as
a suit against the Commonwealth, but subsequently sustained an
action for damages on the "taking" theory. 0 5
Miscellaneous Claims
Garnishment
The first suit against the Commonwealth, Divine v. Harvie,10
was a bill by one Harvie against the Auditor and Treasurer to
attempt a garnishment of the claim of one Divine against the
Commonwealth for services. The lower court ordered the Auditor
Ky. 174 (1858).
"The question therefore is, not whether the court had power to appropriate part of the sinking fund for any other purpose than that to which it had
been devoted by law but whether the fund in contest does actually constitute a
part of the sinking fund." Cf. Comm. of Sinking Fund v. Theobald, 56 Ky. 459
(1856), where recovery of money paid into the Sinking Fund was denied. The
court made a distinction between money paid over into the treasury and stocks
held in the Sinking Fund, but see Ross v. Gross, note 54, supra.
10256 Ky. 313, 76 S.W. 2d 4 (1934).
102260 Ky. 190, 84 S.W. 2d 38 (1935).
'23 Ky. 439 (1828).
158

CLnvs AGAiXsr STATE

to draw a warrant in favor of Harvie instead of Divine, and the
Treasurer to pay the warrant, but the Court of Appeals reversed,
stressing the "great evils" that would arise if the state could be
made gar-nishee. Suits to attach official salaries and fees and funds
due state contractors have been equally unsuccessful. 07 Although
the situation seems to be one where the Auditor could easily be
treated as stakeholder of a fund in which the state has no interest,
the court has refused to take this position, probably because of
the imagined "great evils," although the rule has sometimes been
justified on technical grounds10s
In 1936 the legislature intervened to provide for attachment
or garnishment of salaries and sums due state employees. 0 9 A
1942 amendment, aimed at highway contractors, allowed attachment of "any sums due any person from the Commonwealth." 110
Service of process upon the Commissioner of Finance and the
State Treasurer was required.
Counterclaims
Where the state has sued a citizen, there is always the possibility that he may in turn have a claim against the state. If he
is allowed to assert a counterclaim, the state is made suable to
that extent and the majority rule in the United States refuses to
allow a set-off or counterclaim."' The Kentucky court has apparently felt that it would be too unjust to deny the citizen the
right to use a claim in his defense, and has held that where the
state sues a citizen it waives its immunity to that extent. The
counterclaim may be used only defensively, however, and if it
exceeds the sum sued for by the state, the defendant is not entitled to a judgment over." 2
_'Tracy and Loyd v. Hornbuckle, 71 Kv. 336 (1876) (teacher's salary);
Rodman v. Musselman, 75 Ky. 354 (1876) (salary of city marshal); Dodd v.
Burnett, 172 Ky. 89, 188 S.W. 884 (1916) (fees); B. B. Wilson v. Van Diver,
230 Ky. 27, 18 S.W.2d 308 (1929) (contractor's funds); Miracle v. Hopkins, 260
Ky. 712, 86 S.W. 2d 681 (1935) (official fees).
'In Divine v. Harvie, the court said that a debtor's claim on the state was
not a "chose in action" subject to attachment strictly speaking because the state
could not be sued.
Ky. Acts, 1936, c. 23. Carroll's K. S., 1936, Sec. 1701b. Amended by Ky.
Acts,1 1940,
c. 92.1942, c. 102;
Ky. Acts,
Ky. IEv. STAT. 427.130.
m 49 A. Jin. 297.
'Comm. v. Todd, 72 Ky. 708 (1873); Comm. v. Owensboro & N. R. Co.,
81 Ky. 572, 5 K.L.R. 650 (1884); Comm. v. Barker, 126 Ky. 200, 103 S.W. 303
(1907). Where the counterclaim was based on fraudulent representations by one
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Suits Against State Agencies, Commissions, Departments, and
Subdivisions
What is "the Commonwealth" for purposes of the immunity
rule? Does it include the agencies of the state and subdivisions
such as counties? Where the Commonwealth organized and incorporated a bank and owned all the stock, the Supreme Court
held that the state had divested itself of its immunity and a suit
against the bank was not a suit against the state. 113 At the other
extreme, most departments and commissions are mere unincorporated subdivisions of the state and suit against them is a suit
against the Commonwealth itself.1 4 In an intermediate position
are a number of independent boards and agencies of the state,
some of them created by the legislature as bodies corporate and
often with express power to sue and be sued.
Whether a suit in contract against any of these independent
boards and agencies would now be considered a suit against the
Commonwealth is not clear from the cases. The answer may depend on how the court "construes the facts". In Gross v. Kentucky Board of Managers of the Worlds Columbian Exposition"5
the plaintiff sued the Board for breach of contract and recovered
damages. The statute creating the Board gave it power to contract, but did not make it a body corporate with power to sue and
be sued. After the Board withdrew its entire appropriation and
deposited it in its own name, the legislature passed a resolution
stating the Commonwealth would not be responsible for any
liability the Board might incur in excess of the appropriation.
The court held that the Board was a "quasi-corporation" and a
judgment for damages against it was not an unlawful judgment
against the state, saying:
It is true that this board has been called in an opinion by
the court an "agency of State". It was an agency of the
State, but it was also vested with corporate powers, and in
member of a three-member board, the counterclaim was dismissed. Albin Co. v.
Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 295, 108 S.W.299 (1908). It is doubtful whether any
counterclaim sounding in tort would lie because of the immunity not only from
suit, but also from liability.
'Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Wister, 27 U. S.(2 Pet.) 318,
7 L. ed. 437 (1829).
'B. B. Wilson Co. v. Van Diver et al., 280 Ky. 27, 18 S.W. 2d 808 (1929);
Ky. State Park Comm. v. Wilder, 256 Ky. 313, 76 S.W. 2d 4 (1934).
105 Ky. 840, 49 S.W. 458 (1899).
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its corporate capacity may be sued for its corporate acts,
just as any other corporation.""
The decision was relied upon by the federal court in Bramwell
Brush and Wire Co. v. State Board of Charities"7 as establishing
a general rule that state boards in Kentucky could be quasicorporations with power to sue without specific authorization,
and that they would be recognized as entities distinct from the
Commonwealth for purposes of suit. Dicta have been found in
later cases which support and repudiate the interpretation. In
discussing sovereign immunity generally the court has said:
It is very true that in the Gross case considerable importance appears to have been attached by the Court to the fact
that the board was a quasi corporation, authorized to sue
and be sued, but this circumstance we do not regard as of
controlling importance. If a corporate agency of the state
can be sued, there is no reason why any other agency of the
State cannot be sued. The right to sue cannot rest alone
upon the circumstance that the agent has been created a
corporation by the State. The real question is, is the suit
against the State, or is it against an agency of the State to
compel the agency to do something that the State authorized it to do or to restrain it from8 doing something that the
State did not authorize it to do?"
When the Gross case is analyzed in the light of the above
observation, doubts are raised as to whether the judgment for
damages was allowed because the Board was a quasi-corporation
or because the judgment could be treated as an instance of a suit
against officers to direct payment of a fund or to prevent unauthorized acts. The dissenting opinion in the Gross case makes
it clear that the judges who decided the case believed that the
suability of quasi-corporations was quite a different problem
from the suability of officers, and the issue was whether the
Board was a corporation.
One other factor in the Gross case should be mentioned: the
Id. at 845, 49 S.W. 459.
Fed. 440 (1922). The suit was dismissed on its merits, when the contract proved to be ultra vires. 286 Fed. 737 (1927), affirmed 288 Fed. 1018
(CCA 6th, 1923). The Supreme Court on writ of error dismissed for want of
jurisdiction. 265 U. S. 567 (1923) (diversity case, not arising under laws of
United States, and could be decided on local law).
' Reliance Mfg. Co. v. Bd. of Prison Comm'rs., 161 Ky. 135, 146-147, 170
S.W. 941, 945 (1914).
U279
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distinction made by the court between corporations created to
discharge a "governmental" function and corporations, such as
the World's Fair Board, created to discharge a "business" function." 9 If the Gross case is to be understood as allowing suit
only against state agencies exercising non-governmental functions, its importance diminishes with the increasing tendency to
broaden the meaning of "governmental functions" to include all
activities the state may lawfully carry on. 2 °
Dicta in State Park Comm. v. Wilder121 also tend to support
the view that the corporate form of a state agency does not affect
its immunity. The State Park Commission had purchased a tract
of land for a park, taking title in the name of the Commonwealth.
The plaintiff claiming an interest sued the Commission and the
Commonwealth for partition. The suit was dismissed as one substantially against the Commonwealth even though the Commission was a corporate body with power to sue and be sued.
One case since the Gross case has been found in which the
fact that the agency involved was corporate in form with the
usual corporate powers appeared to be the determining factor.
Commonwealth ex rel. Department of Public Welfare v. Polsgrove, County Judge,"22 was an original proceeding in the Court
of Appeals in which the Commonwealth, on relation of the Department, sought a writ to prevent the Franklin County Judge
from entertaining suits by paroled convicts who were attempting
to recover money due them under a statute upon parole. The
sums sought were too small to allow an appeal from the county
court if the judge erroneously allowed the actions. Counsel for
the Commonwealth contended the suits were against the state
and could not legally be maintained. The court, after finding the
Department of Public Welfare to be a body politic and corporate,
Gross v. Kentucky Board of Managers of the World's Columbia Exposition,
105 Ky. 840, 845, 49 S.W. 458, 459 (1899): "The board was not created to discharge any governmental function. The erection of a headquarters building and
the running of a restaurant were matters of business, in which this board stood on
the same plane as others engaged in like undertakings."
" An agency performs governmental functions if taxes can be levied for its
support and property owned by it is exempt from taxation. Zoeller v. State Board
of Agriculture, 163 Ky. 446, 450, 173 S.W. 1143 (1915). The court said that if
the corporation was not exercising a governmental function it would be liable
even for the torts of its officers and agents.
",256 Ky. 313, 76 S.W. 2d 4 (1934).
250 Ky. 124, 61 S.W. 2d 1076 (1933).
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with power to sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with,
answered:
We therefore conclude that this ground, upon which counsel
insist that respondent [County
Judge] is proceeding out of
123
his jurisdiction is unfounded.
The Court of Appeals thus authorized suits seeking judgments
for the amounts due the parolees, although it went on to say that
execution could not issue on the judgments-some other remedy
would have to be used to enforce the judgments. In this case
the factor of corporate form of the agency alone seemed to be
enough for the court. It was implied in the opinion that if the
action had been on a contract instead of under a mandatory
statute, even less trouble would have been encountered in holding the agency amenable to suit.
One reason for the lack of any substantial number of cases
involving contracts with agencies may be the change in fiscal
procedures. Even if an agency is a body corporate with power to
sue and be sued, most of its funds are appropriated and expended
under the general state budget and finance system. It is believed
that most contracts for agency supplies and services are actually
contracts with the Commonwealth. Contract disputes would be
with the Department of Finance. The distinction between a contract with an agency and a contract with the Commonwealth is
of little importance today. On the other hand, some state agencies
do administer private funds and the suit for breach of contract
against the agency should not be overlooked when the possible
remedies are canvassed.
Where tortious conduct is involved there is clearly no difference between the immunity of the Commonwealth and the immunity of one of its boards or agencies. It was early decided
that even where the legislature had established an institution as
a body corporate with power to sue and be sued, the institution
was not liable in damages for torts of its employees. 124 The grant
Id. at 127, 61 S.W. 2d 1077.
Williamson v. Louisville Industrial School of Reform, 95 Ky. 251, 24 S.W.
1065 (1894); Leavell v. Western Kentucky Asylum for the Insane, 122 Ky. 218,
91 S.W. 671 (1906). In Hauns v. Central Ky. Lunatic Asylum, 103 Ky. 562, 45
S.W. 890 (1898), judgment was for $5000 damages for a nuisance, but the case
has been explained as one of a "taking." Norwood v. Ky. Confederate Home, 172
Ky. 300, 189 S.W. 225 (1916).
'
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of specific authority to sue and be sued "must be taken in a qualified sense," the court said.' 25 The immunity was sometimes
described as resulting from the rule against diversion of trust
funds,126 or because the institution was exercising a "governmental
function,"' 127 but no cases were found in which tort liability was
imposed on a state institution on the ground that its function
was nongovernmental. At one time the court distinguished between suable state institutions and the state itself for purposes of
suits for "taking" or for injunction against nuisance, 28 but it was
soon established that these suits could be maintained regardless
of the official character of the defendant. 2 9
A final word might be said about the political subdivisions of
the state. Counties are not regarded as municipal corporations,
but are mere branches of the state and share its sovereign immunity. 30 School boards, like municipal corporations, can sue
and be sued, but are immune from liability for tort when engaged
in a governmental function.' 3 ' The liability of municipal corporations and school boards is, of course, a complicated problem in
itself and is outside the scope of this series.
Conclusion
The State of Kentucky, by constitutional provision and common law, is immune from suit without the consent of the legislature. Of the practical exceptions to this theoretical principle one
of the most unruly is the suit against the officer. It has been
utilized in cases involving contracts to secure specific performance
and even damages. Where the contract damages are liquidated,
mandamus against the Department of Finance often affords a
remedy. Where the Commonwealth's agents are guilty of trespass
Leavell v. Western Ky. Asylum for the Insane, supra, note 124.
v. Louisville Industrial School of Reform, supra, note 124.
Leavell v. Western Ky. Asylum for the Insane, supra note 124.
'
Zoeller v. State Board of Agriculture, 163 Ky. 446, 173 S.W. 1143 (1915).
This roundabout basis for immunity comes from municipal corporations law. It
would have been more direct merely to assert the nonsuability of state agencies in
denying recovery.
'Hauns
v. Central Ky. Lunatic Asylum, 103 Ky. 562, 45 S.W. 890 (1898).
Herr v. Central Ky. Lunatic Asylum, 97 Ky. 458, 80 S.W. 971 (1895).
Anderson v. State Highway Comm., 252 Ky. 696, 68 S.W. 2d 5 (1934).
Downing v. Mason Co., 87 Ky. 208, 8 S.W. 264 (1888); Forsythe v.
Pendleton Co., 205 Ky. 770, 266 S.W. 639 (1924).
'Wallace v. Laurel Co. Bd. of Educ., 287 Ky. 454, 153 S.W. 2d 915 (1941).
"Williamson
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or nuisance, suits for injunction against nuisance and for damages
for a taking may be maintained, and if taxes are paid under mistake or duress mandamus to compel restitution is available. In
addition, it may be possible to obtain judgments against state
agencies on the ground that they are independent entities.
The over-all picture of Commonwealth liability via the suit

against officers is one of uncertainty. Liability often turns on considerations of legal act v. illegal act, creation of liability v. enforcement of liability, or plain duty v. discretionary act, which

make the outcome fortuitous at best. No good reason appears
why funds in one officer's hand can be taken, while those in another officer's hand cannot; why an injunction can be had against
nuisance, but no damages may be awarded unless it amounts to a
taking; or why refund of taxes paid voluntarily may be enforced,
but refund of fees paid involuntarily or under mistake may not
be. There seems to be a great need for a complete revolution in
this field, legislative or judicial, in order to create some sensible
pattern of state liability.
One general observation that might be made is that the Court
of Appeals of Kentucky has gone much farther than the highest
courts of some of the other states to make the best of a bad situation. It has repeatedly recognized the fundamental injustice of
the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit, and has been
most ingenious in allowing suits against officers and agencies to
repair wrongs inflicted on the individual by the government of
the state. This is particularly true in the wide scope it has given
to the writ of mandamus against the fiscal officers of the state.
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